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Abstract
We present a formalization and computational implementation of the second
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. This ethical principle requires
an agent to never treat someone merely as a means but always also as an
end. Here we interpret this principle in terms of how persons are causally
affected by actions. We introduce Kantian causal agency models in which moral
patients, actions, goals, and causal influence are represented, and we show how
to formalize several readings of Kant’s categorical imperative that correspond
to Kant’s concept of strict and wide duties towards oneself and others. Stricter
versions handle cases where an action directly causally affects oneself or others,
whereas the wide version maximizes the number of persons being treated as an
end. We discuss limitations of our formalization by pointing to one of Kant’s
cases that the machinery cannot handle in a satisfying way.
1 Introduction
It has been suggested that artificial agents, such as social robots and software bots,
must be programmed in an ethical way in order to remain beneficial to human be-
ings. One prominent ethical theory was proposed by Immanuel Kant [1]. Here,
we propose a formalization and implementation of Kant’s ethics with the purpose
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of guiding artificial agents that are to function ethically. In particular, the system
will be able to judge whether actions are ethically permissible according to Kant’s
ethics. In order to accomplish this we focus on the second formulation of Kant’s
categorical imperative. Kant proposed three formulations of the categorical impera-
tive. We formalize and implement the second formulation and do not take a stance
on the interrelation of Kant’s three formulations. The second formulation of Kant’s
categorical imperative reads:
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but
always at the same time as an end. (Kant, 1785)
We take it to be the core of the second formulation of the categorical imperative
that all rational beings affected by our actions must be considered as part of the
goal of the action.
The paper is structured as follows: We first briefly review related work. Then,
building upon our earlier work [2], we introduce an extension of Pearl-Halpern-style
causal networks which we call Kantian causal agency models. These models serve
as a formal apparatus to model the morally relevant aspects of situations. We then
define an action’s permissibility due to the categorical imperative, while considering
two readings of being treated as a means. To deal with Kant’s wider duties, we intro-
duce an extra condition according to which an agent should maximize the number
of persons being treated as an end. Finally, we briefly showcase the computational
implementation of the categorical imperative within the HERA software library1.
2 Related work
In machine ethics, several ethical theories have been formalized and implemented,
e.g., utilitarianism, see [3, 4], the principle of double effect, see [5, 6], pareto permis-
sibility, see [2], and Asimov’s laws of robotics, see [7].
It has been suggested for some time that Kant’s ethics could be formalized and
implemented computationally, see [8, 9]. Powers [8] suggests three possible ways of
formalizing Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative, through deontic
logic, non-monotonic logic, or belief revision. The first formulation of the categorical
imperative states that you must be able to want that the subjective reasoning (or
maxim) motivating your action becomes a universal law and as Kant claims that
this in some cases is a purely formal matter, it should be possible to formalize it.
1http://www.hera-project.com
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However, Powers does not provide details of a formalization or a computational
implementation, so the formalization of the first formulation in effect remains an
open problem.
The work presented here differs in that we focus on the second formulation of
the categorical imperative and in that we present a precise formal representation
and computational implementation of the formal theory. Rather than taking a
starting point in one of the paradigms Powers suggests, we use formal semantics
and causal agency modelling as this is fitting for the means-end reasoning central to
the second formulation. Philosophically, our formalization is best seen as a rational
reconstruction within this framework of what we take to be the central ideas of
Kant’s second formulation.
We think the second formulation has some intuitive appeal also to modern peo-
ple, many people perceive that there is something morally wrong in using people
(including yourself) without consideration of how it affects them. Ultimately, al-
though we are sensitive to Kant’s original text, the goal of our work is not to get
close to a correct interpretation of Kant, but to show that our interpretation of
Kant’s ideas can contribute to the development of machine ethics. To meet this
goal, our interpretation has to be detailed and explicit enough to provide a decision
mechanism for the permissibility or not of specific actions in specific situations.
3 Kantian causal agency models
In order to formalize the second formulation of the categorical imperative, we assume
some background theory. First, we assume that actions are performed by agents, and
that actions and their consequences can affect a set of moral patients, i.e. persons
who must be considered ethically in a situation. The agent itself is also one of the
moral patients. The agent has available a set of actions which will have consequences
given background conditions. Some of the action’s consequences are the goals of the
action. The actions and consequences that together cause my goal are the means of
the action. Patients, who are affected by these means are treated as a means, and
patients, who are affected by my goal are treated as an end. For example, I (agent)
have the option available to press the light switch (action), and given that the light
bulb is not broken (background condition), the light will go on (consequence), which
leads to me being able to read my book (consequence). The last consequence was
also my goal, and it affects me in a positive way. The action thus treats me as an
end.
Within this informally characterized framework, we can reformulate the second
formulation of the categorical imperative as follows:
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Act in such a way, that whoever is treated as a means through your action
(positively or negatively and including yourself), must also be treated as
an end of your action.
The purpose of what follows is to formalize these intuitions. As a first step, we
now give the formal definition of the models we will be using in Definition 1. We
call these models Kantian causal agency models to set them apart from the causal
agency models we used in our earlier work [2], and which had no formal tools to
consider moral patients affected by one’s actions.
Definition 1 (Kantian Causal Agency Model). A Kantian causal agency model
M is a tuple (A,B,C, F,G, P,K,W ), where A is the set of action variables, B is
a set of background variables, C is a set of consequence variables, F is a set of
modifiable boolean structural equations, G = (Goala1 , . . . , Goalan) is a list of sets
of variables (one for each action), P is a set of moral patients (includes a name for
the agent itself), K is the ternary affect relation K ⊆ (A ∪ C) × P × {+,−}, and
W is a set of interpretations (i.e., truth assignments) over A ∪B.
A (actions), B (background variables) and C (consequences) are finite sets of
boolean variables with B and C possibly empty. W is a set of boolean interpretations
of A ∪ B. Thus, the elements of W set the truth values of those variables that are
determined externally, and thus specify the concrete situation. We require that
all interpretations in W assign true to exactly one action a ∈ A. As a notational
convention, by M,wa and M,wb we distinguish two situations that only differ in
that in the first situation, action a is performed, and in the second situation, action
b is performed.
Causal influence is determined by the set F of boolean-valued structural equa-
tions. Each variable ci ∈ C is associated with the function fi ∈ F . This function will
give ci its value under an interpretation w ∈W . An interpretation w is extended to
the consequence variables as follows: For a variable ci ∈ C, let {ci1, . . . , cim−1} be
the variables of C \ {ci}, B = b1, . . . , bk, and A = {a1, . . . , an} the action variables.
The assignment of truth values to consequences is determined by:
w(ci) = fi(w(a1), . . . , w(an), w(b1), . . . , w(bk), w(ci1), . . . , w(cim−1))
To improve readability, we will use the notation c := φ to express that c is true
if φ is true, where φ can be any boolean formula containing variables from A∪B∪C
and its negations. For instance, the boolean structural equations for the light-switch
example will be written as F = {lightOn := press∧¬bulbBroken, canReadBook :=
lightOn}.
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In the general setting, it may be unfeasible to extend an interpretation from the
action variables to the rest of the variables, because it is possible that the value of
some variable depends on the value of another variable, and the value of the latter
variable depends on the value of the former. Dependence is defined in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Dependence). Let vi ∈ C, vj ∈ A ∪ B ∪ C be distinct variables. The
variable vi depends on variable vj, if, for some vector of boolean values, fi(. . . , vj =
0, . . .) 6= fi(. . . , vj = 1, . . .).
Following Halpern [10], we restrict causal agency models to acyclic models, i.e.,
models in which no two variables are mutually dependent on each other. First, note
that the values of action variables in set A and the values of background variables
in set B are determined externally by the interpretations in W . Thus, the truth
values of action variables and background variables do not depend on any other
variables. Additionally, we require that the transitive closure, ≺, of the dependence
relation is a partial order on the set of variables: v1 ≺ v2 reads “v1 is causally
modified by v2”. This enforces absence of cycles. In case of acyclic models, the
values of all consequence variables can be determined unambiguously: First, there
will be consequence variables only causally modified by action and/or background
variables, and whose truth value can thus be determined by the values set by the
interpretation. Call these consequence variables level one. On level two, there will
be consequence variables causally modified by action variable, background variables,
and level-one consequence variables, and so on [5, 10].
Some of the definitions below will make use of causality. Thus, to take causation
into account, Definition 3 defines the relation of y being a but-for cause of φ, see
[10]. Definition 3 makes use of external interventions on models. An external inter-
ventions X consists of a set of literals (viz., action variables, consequence variables,
background variables, and negations thereof). Applying an external intervention to
a causal agency model results in a new causal agency model MX . The truth of a
variable v ∈ A∪B∪C inMX is determined in the following way: If v ∈ X, then v is
true inMX , if ¬v ∈ X, then v is false inMX , and if neither v ∈ X nor ¬v ∈ X, then
the truth of v is determined according to its structural equation in M . External
interventions thus override structural equations of the variables occurring in X.
Definition 3 (Actual but-for cause). Let y be a literal and φ a formula. We say that
y is an actual but-for cause of φ (notation: y ❀ φ) in the situation the agent choses
option wa in model MX , if and only if MX , wa |= y∧φ and M(X\{y})∪{¬y}, wa |= ¬φ.
The first condition requires that both the cause and the effect must be actual.
The second condition requires that if y had not been the case, then φ would have not
5
Lindner and Bentzen
occurred. Thus, in the chosen situation, y was necessary to bring about φ. Consider
again the book reading situation M,w, such that w(bulbBroken) = ⊥, w(press) =
⊤. Due to the structural equations (see above), we have both M,w |= press and
M,w |= canReadBook. Also, in the intervention where the agent does not press
the light switch, the agent cannot read the book, M{¬press} |= ¬canReadBook.
Therefore, in situation M,w, press is a but-for cause of canReadBook.
Generally, the definition of but-for cause allows to talk about individual actions
and consequences and their causal effects on other individual consequences in the
given situation, as well as counterfactual effects if the situation were different from
the actual situation. The definition does not allow conjunctive or disjunctive causes.
Consequently, this definition of causality does not cope with cases of preemption.
For instance, consider the agent shoots at someone who is already about to die,
because he was poisened just a minute ago. In this case, the agent’s shot is not a
but-for cause for the patient’s death—but the disjunction of the agent’s shot and
the patient being poisened is. Our examples work with the simpler but-for causality,
so we do not discuss more sophisticated definitions of causality (but see [10]).
Based on the concept of but-for cause the useful concept of direct consequences
is introduced via Definition 4.
Definition 4 (Direct Consequence). A consequence c ∈ C is a direct consequence
of v ∈ A ∪B ∪C in the situation MX , wa iff MX , wa |= v ❀ c.
With regard to modeling moral patients affected by effects, we assert that persons
can be affected by actions or consequences either in a positive or in a negative
way. To represent that some action or consequence (knowingly) affects a person
positively or negatively, we introduce the notations ⊲+ and ⊲−, respectively. Thus,
MX , wa |= c ⊲+ p holds iff (a, c,+) ∈ K, and MX , wa |= c ⊲− p holds iff (a, c,−) ∈ K.
We use ⊲ in case the valence of affection is not relevant. As a means to refer to the
goals of some action, we define MX , wa |= Goal(c) iff c ∈ Goala, i.e., a consequence
c is the goal in the agent’s chosen situation wa iff c is in the set of goals associated
with action a (cf., Def. 1).
This finalizes the exposition of the background theory.
4 Categorical imperative defined
We now consider how to make permissibility judgments about actions as defined in
the context of Kantian causal agency models using the categorical imperative. The
second formulation of the categorical imperative requires an agent to never treat
someone merely as a means but always also as an end. Thus, to formalize under
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which conditions an action is permitted by the categorical imperative, we first define
the concept of someone being treated as an end (Definition 5). We then proceed to
formalize two possible readings of the concept of someone being treated as a means
(Definition 6 and Definition 7).
Definition 5 (Treated as an End). A patient p ∈ P is treated as an end by action
a, written MX , wa |= End(p), iff the following conditions hold:
1. Some goal g of a affects p positively.
MX , wa |=
∨
g
(
Goal(g) ∧ g ⊲+ p
)
.
2. None of the goals of a affect p negatively.
MX , wa |=
∧
g(Goal(g)→ ¬(g ⊲− p))
Thus, being treated as an end by some action means that some goal of the
action affects one in a positive way. One could say that the agent of the action, by
performing that action, considers those who benefit from her goal. Things are less
clear regarding the concept ‘being treated as a means’. As a first step, we define two
versions of the concept which we refer to as Reading 1 and Reading 2. Both readings
make use of the causal consequences of actions. Reading 1 considers a person used
as a means in case she is affected by some event that causally brings about some
goal of the action.
Definition 6 (Treated as a Means, Reading 1). A patient p ∈ P is treated as a
means by action a (according to Reading 1), written MX , wa |=Means1(p), iff there
is some v ∈ A ∪ C, such that v affects p, and v is a cause of some goal g, i.e.,
MX , wa |=
∨
v
(
(a❀ v ∧ v ⊲ p) ∧
∨
g(v ❀ g ∧Goal(g))
)
.
As a consequence, negative side effects are permitted under Reading 1. Consider,
for instance, the classical trolley dilemma, where the agent has the choice to either
pull the lever to lead the tram onto the second track killing one person, or refraining
from pulling letting the tram kill five persons on the first track (see Fig. 1). Under
Reading 1, in case of pulling, the one agent—person 6 in Fig. 1—is not treated as
a means: If, counterfactually, person 6 survived although the switch was pulled,
then this would not deactivate any of the agent’s goals. Therefore, the formula
¬survive6 ❀ survive1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬survive6 ❀ survive5 is not satisfied by the model
of the classical trolley problem. Reading 1 is probably closest to what we informally
mean by ‘being treated as a means’.
Reading 2 requires that everybody affected by any direct consequence of the
action is considered as a goal.
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A = {pull}
C = {survive1, . . . , survive6}
P = {person1, . . . , person6}
F = {survive1 := pull, . . . , survive5 := pull, survive6 := ¬pull}
K = {(survive1, person1,+), (¬survive1, person1,−), . . .}
G = (Goalpull = {survive1, . . . , survive5})
Figure 1: Model of the classical trolley problem. Person 1 to person 5 are together
on the one track, person 6 alone on the other track.
Definition 7 (Treated as a Means, Reading 2). A patient p ∈ P is treated as a
means by action a (according to Reading 2), written MX , wa |=Means2(p), iff there
is some direct consequence v ∈ A ∪ C of a, such that v affects p, i.e., MX , wa |=∨
v
(
a❀ v ∧ v ⊲ p
)
.
Hence, under Reading 2, also the person on the second track must be considered
as a goal. Consequently, everyone treated as a means according to Reading 1 is
also treated as a means according Reading 2, but Reading 2 may include additional
patients. Reading 2 is further from the everyday understanding of means-end rea-
soning, but is probably closer to what some people expect of a Kantian ethics, viz.,
that everyone affected by the direct consequences of one’s actions must be consid-
ered. We consider it a feature of a formal framework that this distinction can be
formalized, but we leave it for the modeler to decide which one of the readings is
more useful for a given application. One thing to note is that Kantian causal-agency
models are meant to represent what an agent considers possible. Hence, the agent
uses some patient as a means in case she knowingly affects that patient. Thus, the
formalization does not require an agent to consider affected moral patients she was
not aware of. For instance, if the reader of this paper feels affected by what she
reads, then, of course, the authors are not using her as a means.
Having defined both being treated as an end and being treated as a means, the
permissibility of actions according to the second formulation of the categorical im-
perative can now be defined in Definition 8. The formulation requires that no-one
is merely used as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
Definition 8 (Categorical Imperative). An action a is permitted according to the
categorical imperative, iff for any p ∈ P , if p is treated as a means (according to
Reading N) then p is treated as an end MX , wa |=
∧
p∈P (MeansN (p)→ End(p)).
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A = {suicide}
C = {dead}
P = {Bob}
F = {dead := suicide}
K = {(suicide,Bob,+)}
G = (Goalsuicide = {dead})
(a) Model M1
A = {amputate}
C = {survives}
P = {Bob}
F = {survives := amputate}
K = {(amputate,Bob,−),
(survives,Bob,+)}
G = (Goalamputate = {survives})
(b) Model M∗
1
Figure 2: Kantian Causal Agency Models yielding the impermissibility of Suicide
(M1) and the permissibility of Amputation (M
∗
1 ).
There are thus two main reasons why an action is not permitted: Either a patient
is treated as a means but is left out of consideration by the end of the action. Or,
the action is done for an end that affects someone negatively.
5 Cases of strict duty
We will now provide examples that highlight aspects of the definition of the cate-
gorical imperative. Although these do not prove it correct in any formal sense they
can be used to discuss its appeal as an ethical principle as an explication of Kant’s
ideas. First, we rephrase three cases that contain what Kant calls strict duties (and
two of which Kant himself used to explain his ideas).
5.1 Example 1: Suicide
Bob wants to commit suicide, because he feels so much pain he wants to be relieved
from. This case can be modeled by a causal agency model M1 that contains one
action variable suicide and a consequence variable dead, see Figure 2a. Death is
the goal of the suicide action (as modeled by the set G), and the suicide affects Bob
(as modeled by the set K). In this case, it does not make a difference whether the
suicide action affects Bob positively or negatively.
The model assumes that the suicide affects no-one other than Bob, because
Kant’s argument is not about the effect of suicide on other people but about the lack
of respect of the person committing suicide. The reason why Bob’s suicide is not per-
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mitted is that the person affected by the suicide, viz., Bob, does not benefit from the
goal, because he is destroyed and thus cannot be affected positively by it. He is thus
treated as a means to his own annihilation from which he receives no advancement.
Therefore, the first condition of the categorical imperative (Definition 8) is violated
according to both readings (1 and 2), becauseM1, wsuicide |=Means{1,2}(Bob) holds
but M1, wsuicide |= End(Bob) does not.
As noted above, it could also be said that the suicide affects Bob negatively,
and the action would also be impermissible. The reason for the impermissibility
of suicide also in this case is not due to the fact that Bob does something harmful
towards himself. As Kant also remarks, other harmful actions would be allowed,
e.g., risking your life or amputating a leg to survive. To see this, consider Fig. 2b,
where M1 has been be slightly modified to M
∗
1 : Rename suicide to amputate and
dead to survives. Moreover, add (amputate,Bob,−) to K. In this case, Bob is
positively affected by the goal, and thus the act of amputation is permitted. The
modified example also shows that in some cases, the categorical imperative is more
permissive than the principle of double effect, which strictly speaking never allows
negative means to an end (cf., [5]).
5.2 Example 2: Giving flowers
The fact that an action can be judged as impermissible by the categorical imperative
although no-one is negatively affected is a property of the categorical imperative
that inheres in no other moral principles formalized so far. The following example
showcases another situation to highlight this property: Bob gives Alice flowers in
order to make Celia happy when she sees that Alice is thrilled about the flowers.
Alice being happy is not part of the goal of Bob’s action. We model this case by
considering the Kantian causal agency model M2 shown in Figure 3a.
In the model M2, the action give_flowers is not permitted according to the
categorical imperative, because Bob is using Alice as a means to make Celia happy,
but not considering her as part of the goal of the action. This action is immoral,
even though the action has positive consequences for all, and no bad consequence
are used to obtain a good one. Again, this example shows how the Kantian principle
differs from other ethical principles such as utilitarianism and the principle of double
effect, because these principles would permit the action.
The modelM2 can be extended to model M
∗
2 shown in Figure 3b. In model M
∗
2 ,
Bob’s action is permitted by the Kantian principle. The only thing in which M∗2
differs fromM2 is that the variable alice_happy is added to the set Goalgive_flowers.
In this case, Alice is both treated as a means and treated as an end, which is
permitted by the categorical imperative.
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A = {give_flowers}
C = {alice_happy, celia_happy}
P = {Bob,Alice, Celia}
F = {alice_happy := give_flowers
celia_happy := alice_happy}
K = {(alice_happy,Alice,+),
(celia_happy,Celia,+)}
G = (Goalgive_flowers =
{celia_happy})
(a) Model M2
A = {give_flowers}
C = {alice_happy, celia_happy}
P = {Bob,Alice, Celia}
F = {alice_happy := give_flowers
celia_happy := alice_happy}
K = {(alice_happy,Alice,+),
(celia_happy,Celia,+)}
G = (Goalgive_flowers =
{celia_happy, alice_happy})
(b) Model M∗
2
Figure 3: Kantian Causal Agency Models yielding the impermissibility of giving
flowers to Alice to make Celia happy (M2) and the permissibility of doing so if
making Celia happy is a goal as well (M∗2 ).
The flower example demonstrates how demanding the categorical imperative is,
because the principles requires that everybody affected by ones’ action must be
treated as a goal: This includes the taxi driver that drives you to your destination,
as well as the potential murderer you defend yourself against. In these examples, the
ethical principle requires one to, e.g., have the taxi driver’s earning money among
one’s goals, and the murderer’s not going to jail.
5.3 Example 3: False promise
We return to a case mentioned by Kant himself. Consider that Bob makes a false
promise to Alice. Bob borrows one 100 Dollars from Alice with the goal of keeping
the money forever. He knows that it is an inevitable consequence of borrowing the
money that he will never pay it back. Figure 4 shows the model of this situation,M3.
The action is impermissible, because Alice is treated as a means (by both Reading
1, Definition 6, and Reading 2, Definition 7). However, none of the two conditions
for ‘being treated as an end’ (Definition 5) are met: None of the goals affects Alice
positively, and Bob’s goal affects her negatively.
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A = {borrow}
C = {bob_keeps_100Dollar_forever}
P = {Alice}
F = {bob_keeps_100Dollar_forever := borrow}
K = {(borrow,Bob,+), (borrow,Alice,−),
(bob_keeps_100Dollar_forever,Bob,+),
(bob_keeps_100Dollar_forever,Alice,−)}
G = (Goalborrow = {bob_keeps_100Dollar_forever})
Figure 4: Model M3 for the case of Bob making a false promise to Alice.
6 Cases of wide duty
Examples 1, 2 and 3 are instances of what Kant calls necessary, strict, narrower
duties to oneself and to others, and it seems obvious they involve using a person
as a means. Kant also presents two other examples to which we now turn in this
section. These involve what Kant calls contingent, meritorious, or wider duties. His
arguments for these appear more vague and at least from our perspective harder to
handle. We now turn to wide duties and discuss, through an example, how actions
that indirectly affect others by refraining from preventing harmful consequences
could be handled in the formal framework. Another example will demonstrate where
the limitations of our formalization attempt are.
6.1 Example 4: Not helping others
Bob who has everything he needs, does not want to help Alice who is in need. Let
us assume she is drowning and Bob is refraining from saving her live. Formally,
the situation in the example can be represented with a causal agency model M4
that contains one background variable accident representing the circumstances that
led to Alice being in dire straits, two action variables rescue and refrain and a
consequence variable drown. Moreover, ¬drown is the goal of rescue. See Figure 5
for the specification of the model.
According to the categorical imperative using Readings 1 and 2 of ‘being treated
as a means’ both rescue and refrain are permitted. Bob is strictly speaking not
using Alice as a means by going about his business. Kant gives us a clue of how
to formalize an argument against refraining in that he says we have to make other
12
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A = {rescue, refrain}
B = {accident}
C = {drown}
P = {Alice,Bob}
F = {drown := accident ∧ ¬rescue}
K = {(drown,Alice,−), (¬drown,Alice,+)}
G = (Goalrescue = {¬drown}, Goalrefrain = ∅)
Figure 5: Model M4 for the impermissibility of not helping others.
people’s ends our own as far as possible. Kant writes that ‘For a positive harmony
with humanity as an end in itself, what is required is that everyone positively tries
to further the ends of others as far as he can.’ One way of understanding this is
as an additional requirement on top of the categorical imperative of choosing an
action whose goals affect most people positively. This understanding is captured in
Definition 9.
Definition 9 (Meritorious principle). Among actions permitted by the categorical
imperative, choose one whose goals affect most patients positively.
The meritorious principle thus goes beyond simply avoiding to treat others as
means by actively helping them. As formulated here, the principle is compatible
with the categorical imperative. In our example, it requires of the agent to choose
saving Alice, because the goal advances her. There may be several actions advancing
the same number of agents, in which case the agent can choose freely (or randomly)
amongst them. One could also take Kant to imply a second condition to the merito-
rious principle, to prevent as many people being negatively affected by circumstances
as possible. In the current example, both conditions would lead to the same result.
6.2 Unhandled case: Not using your talent
As a final example, consider the following situation: Bob has the talent to become a
great artist. However, he wonders whether it is permissible to just be lazy and enjoy
life instead of working hard to improve himself. Strictly speaking Bob is not working
to anyone’s disadvantage by being lazy and thus the definitions of ‘being treated as
a means’ advanced above will not cover this example. As the goal of enjoying life
and the goal of making art both benefit Bob, the meritorious principle also cannot
13
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be used to make the distinction. What Kant says is that laziness could be consistent
with the preservation of humanity but does not harmonize with its advancement. He
also writes that a rational being necessarily wills that all his capacities are developed.
However, it is not clear to us what constitutes the advancement of humanity beyond
the sheer feeling of happiness. The example is further complicated by the fact that
Kant says that this is a duty one has towards oneself, not others. Therefore, it would
be inappropriate to solve this case by introducing others into the model that would
benefit from Bob becoming an artist.
In the current formalization, we have no means to represent the relevant aspects
that render laziness impermissible and becoming an artist permissible for the right
reasons. We thus take this example to showcase a limitation of our treatment of
Kant’s ethics, and leave a formalization that could capture this last example for
further research.
7 Implementation within the HERA framework
The formalization of Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative has
been implemented within the Hybrid Ethical Reasoning Agent software library
(short: HERA).2 The general goal of the HERA project is to provide theoretically
well-founded and practically usable logic-based machine ethics tools for implemen-
tation in artificial agents, such as companion robots with moral competence [11].
The core of HERA consists of a model checker for (Kantian) causal agency models.
Thus, the situations the agent can reason about are represented in terms of models,
and ethical principles like the categorical imperative are implemented as (sets of)
logical formulae. To showcase the use the categorical imperative from a Python
program, Listing 1 reconsiders a representation of the suicide case.
{
" actions": [" suicide"],
" background": [],
" consequences": ["dead"],
" patients": ["Bob"],
" mechanisms": {"dead": "suicide"},
" affects": {" suicide": [["Bob", "+"]],
" dead": []},
" goals": {"suicide": ["dead"]}
}
Listing 1: A sample JSON encoding of the suicide case.
2The HERA software is available from http://www.hera-project.com . It is fully implemented
in Python and can be installed via the PyPI repository (package name: ethics).
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The workflow for using HERA requires to first generate a causal agency model
like the one in Listing 1. Given such a model, arbitrary logical formulae can be
checked for being satisfied or not by this model. This way, the conditions of ethical
principles like the Kantian categorical imperative as defined in Definition 8 can be
checked for satisfaction.
To support the usage of the HERA library, the logical formulae to be checked for
ethical principles already included in HERA are encapsulated into prepared classes.
Listing 2 shows a sample interaction. The first three commands load the implemen-
tations of two syntactical entities of the logical language (the predicates Means and
End), the causal agency model from the semantics package, and the categorical im-
perative using Reading 1 of ‘being treated as a means’ from the principles package.
The third command loads the suicide example and sets the external variable suicide
to the value True. This way, the suicide action is chosen in the situation, and the
truth values of the consequence variables can be evaluated the way explained in Sec-
tion 3. In the concrete case, True will be assigned to the variable dead. The fourth
command asks whether, in the resulting situation, Bob is used as a means according
to Reading 1 (see Definition 6). The answer is True, because Bob is affected by the
action (suicide) and the action is a but-for cause of Bob’s goal (dead). The fifth
command asks if Bob is used as an end. This query returns False, because Bob is
not affected by the goal (see Section Example 1: Suicide). All in all, the action is
not permissible according to the categorical imperative, and the output of the last
command is accordingly.
from e t h i c s . language import Means , End
from e t h i c s . s emant ic s import CausalModel as cm
from e t h i c s . p r i n c i p l e s import KantianHumanityPrinciple as c i
m = cm( " s u i c i d e . j s on " , { " s u i c i d e " : True})
m. models (Means( " Reading−1" , "Bob" ) )
output: True
m. models (End( "Bob" ) )
output: False
m. eva lua te ( c i )
output: False
Listing 2: A sample interaction with the Python package ethics, which we develop
and maintain as the standard implementation of HERA.
8 Conclusion
We have shown proof of principle how Kant’s second formulation of the categorical
imperative can be formalized and implemented computationally. The strict duties
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towards yourself and others are defined, given goals, structural equations, and the
affects relation. To define permissibility according the categorical imperative, we
have defined ‘being treated as an end’, and we formalized two readings of ‘being
treated as a means’ that meet different intuitions about this concept. The formal-
ization deals well with Kant’s own examples of strict duties. We were also able to
partly deal with Kant’s wide duties by defining an additional condition that requires
agents to maximize the number of persons being treated as an end.
We envision that the theory will be used as a tool for the comparison of morally
relevant aspects of different views on morally delicate cases, thus helping people to
have moral discussions. Moreover, we aim at allowing automatic moral judgments in
line with Kant in robots such as self-driving cars, care robots, robot companions, and
robotic tutors. Our current research investigates whether and under which circum-
stances Kantian reasoning the way it is presented here is perceived as appropriate for
social robots as compared to other types of moral reasoning already defined within
HERA.
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